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LICENSE TO KILL: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
LEGALITY OF FULLY AUTONOMOUS 
DRONES IN THE CONTEXT OF 
INTERNATIONAL USE OF FORCE LAW 
Andrew Figueroa* 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
We live in a world of constant technological change; and with this 
change, comes unknown effects and consequences. This is even truer 
with weapons and warfare. Indeed, as the means and methods of 
warfare rapidly modify and transform, the effects and consequences 
on the laws of war are unknown. This Article addresses one such 
development in weapon and warfare technology—Fully 
Autonomous Weapons or “Killer Robots”—and discusses the 
inevitable use of these weapons within the current international law 
framework. Recognizing the current, inadequate legal framework, 
this Article proposes a regulation policy to mitigate the risks 
associated with Fully Autonomous Weapons. But the debate should 
not end here; States and the U.N. must work together to adopt a 
legal framework that coincides with the advancement of technology. 
This Article starts that discussion. 
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[W]ar is still, somehow, a rule-governed activity, a world of 
permissions and prohibitions—a moral world, therefore, in the midst of 
hell. 
–– Michael Walzer1 
 
 Are we going to let the fact that these [new technologies] look like 
science fiction, sound like science fiction, and feel like science fiction, keep 
us in denial that these are battlefield reality? Are we going to be like a 
previous generation that looked at another science fiction-like technology, 
the atomic bomb? The name “atomic bomb” and the concept come from 
an H.G. Wells short story. Indeed, the very concept of the nuclear chain 
reaction also came from that same sci-fi short story. Are we going to be 
like that past generation that looked at this stuff and said, “We don’t have 
to wrestle with all the moral, social, and ethical issues that come out of it 
until after Pandora’s box is open?” 
––Peter Singer2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the beginning of human existence to the present date, 
war has certainly been part of the human condition.3  As warfare 
continues to evolve, the means and methods of warfare follow the 
same course.4  Indeed, military technology is driven by constant 
change—each actor in pursuit of being better, faster, and stronger.5  
This constant development of technology raises difficult legal 
questions concerning the laws of war.  Specifically, “[n]ew 
                                                            
1 MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT 
WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 36 (5th ed. 2015). 
2 P.W. Singer, Ethical Implications of Military Robotics, The 2009 
William C. Stutt Ethics Lecture 19 (Mar. 25, 2009) (transcript available at 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/usna_singer_robot_ethics.pdf). 
3 Kurt Larson & Zachary Malamud, The United States, Pakistan, the Law 
of War and the Legality of the Drone Attacks, 10 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 1, 1 (2011). 
4 Id. 
5 Gary E. Marchant et al., International Governance of Autonomous 
Military Robots, 12 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 272, 274 (2011). 
3
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technology has often moved faster than the laws of war.”6  One of 
the most recent developments in warfare, and highly controversial, 
is the legality of employing drones to target enemies.  The 
discussion, however, does not end there.  
In the past decade, technological developments have 
dramatically increased the number and variety of drones.7  With the 
improving technologies and capabilities, the drone debate shifts to 
the impact and legality of computer-automated drones, or “killer 
robots”—fully autonomous killing machines that select and engage 
targets without human input—as a means of employing justified use 
of force.8  Indeed, the modernization of military robotics, with 
autonomous decision-making capability, is a recent development 
that has largely escaped public debate, leaving a host of unanswered 
international use of force questions.9  Does the use of these types of 
drones change the implications of the laws of war?  Can autonomous 
decision-making drones be a justifiable use of force under the 
current international law framework?  Who will be accountable for 
the unjustified use of these drones?  These never-before anticipated 
and complex legal questions will be at the forefront of an extensive 
and intense debate once fully autonomous weapons are fully 
employed in the battlefield.10 
The hesitation of employing fully autonomous weapons 
(“FAWs”) is due to fear that these weapons will reduce costs and 
allow warfare to become too easy, which will result in swelled kill 
lists and ultimately, a short-circuit in the decision-making process.11  
                                                            
6 P. W. SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR: THE ROBOTICS REVOLUTION AND 
CONFLICT IN THE 21ST CENTURY 387 (2009). 
7 Laurie R. Blank, After “Top Gun”: How Drone Strikes Impact the Law 
of War, 33 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 675, 678 (2012). 
8 BONNIE DOCHERTY, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOSING HUMANITY: THE 
CASE AGAINST KILLER ROBOTS (Nov. 19, 2012), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/11/19/losing-humanity/case-against-killer-
robots.  
9 See generally Marchant et al., supra note 5 (discussing various 
questions raised). 
10 See generally Blank, supra note 7, at 679 (discussing the questions 
raised by the use of drones in war and as a means of targeted killings). 
11 Peter W. Singer, Do Drones Undermine Democracy?, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 21, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/22/opinion/sunday/do-
drones-undermine-democracy.html. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss1/3
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In particular, a State’s decision to use force “used to be the most 
important choice a democracy could make,” but now, FAWs can be 
employed with minimal human intervention and swiftly, without 
“any actual political debate.”12  The unexpected consequences, 
however, are difficult to analyze since these autonomous weapons 
have yet to be employed in their full capacity.13  But the fear of 
robotic warfare, machine takeover, and Terminator innuendos,14 
must not be the sole basis for prohibiting the development and use 
of FAWs.  This Article discusses the inevitable use of these weapons 
and proposes that all States work together to adopt a framework to 
regulate these new technologies. Indeed, FAWs are not the problem, 
it is the de minimis threshold that allows States to deploy force 
without any legal ramifications or accountability.  Ultimately, this 
Article, after applying the use of FAWs to the current legal 
justifications for force, proposes a regulation policy to mitigate the 
risks associated with FAWs. 
This Article will not solely concentrate on U.S. based-
development or U.S. perspectives, but instead, will focus on the 
international spectrum of autonomous weapons and the implications 
on international use of force law.  In four sections, this Article will 
discuss: (I) a brief discussion of the history of drones and FAWs, 
with a discussion of policy perspectives and current legal 
challenges; (II) a review of current and different viewpoints on the 
issue; (III) an individualized explanation on the legality of 
employing FAWs with respect to established international use of 
force justifications; and (IV) a policy proposal concerning the future 
use of these weapons in regard to international use of force. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
12 Id. 
13 See Jay Logan Rogers, Note, Legal Judgment Day for the Rise of the 
Machines: A National Approach to Regulating Fully Autonomous Weapons, 56 
ARIZ. L. REV. 1257, 1269–70 (2014) (noting that some militaries may currently 
be using automated robots, but that these militaries still operate these robots with 
human monitoring and oversight).  
14 SINGER, supra note 6, at 416. 
5
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II. DRONES AND FULLY AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS:   
HISTORY, POLICY, AND CHALLENGES 
A. Background on Drones and Fully Autonomous Weapon 
Systems 
In response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, 
President George W. Bush authorized the use of drones against 
leaders of al-Qaeda forces pursuant to Congress’ Authorization for 
Use of Military Force.15  In addition, the U.N. Security Council 
unanimously passed a resolution that recognized the U.S.’ right to 
self-defense and gave direct authorization for it to enter Afghanistan 
and use force against the suspected terrorists.16  The implication of 
the 2001 terrorist attacks is that the use of drones, as a weapon of 
war, was unleashed.17  Thereafter, drone strikes drastically increased 
as a result of al-Qaeda and its affiliated terror groups reconstituting 
in the Pakistani tribal areas.18  Prior to the Bush Administration’s 
employment of drones as a weapon of war, drones were utilized 
exclusively for intelligence gathering and surveillance.19  Drones 
have, however, become the weapon of choice to target and kill 
terrorists.20  Specifically, President Obama, in his first-year of office 
                                                            
15 Milena Sterio, The United States’ Use of Drones in the War on Terror: 
The (Il)legality of Targeted Killings Under International Law, 45 CASE W. RES. 
J. INT’L L. 197, 198 (2012); see also Gregory S. McNeal, Responses to the Ten 
Questions, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 5113, 5114 (2010) (noting that pursuant to 
the Authorization for the Use of Military Force, President George W. Bush had 
authority to “use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, 
organizations, or persons he determine[d] planned, authorized, committed, or 
aided the terrorist attacks”). 
16 Eveylon Corrie Westbrook Mack, Remotely Piloted Aircrafts (RPAS) 
in Targeted Killing Operations: The United States is No Lone Wolf, 26 FLA. J. 
INT’L L. 447, 466 (2014). 
17 See Sterio, supra note 15, at 198; see also National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No. 106–398, § 220(a)(2), 114 
Stat. 1654, 1654A–38 (2000) (mandating that by 2015 one-third of operational 
ground combat vehicles and aircraft be unmanned). 
18 Larson & Malamud, supra note 3, at 9. 
19 Susan Breau & Marie Aronsson, Drone Attacks, International Law, 
and the Recording of Civilian Casualties of Armed Conflict, 35 SUFFOLK 
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 255, 255 (2012). 
20 Id.  
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss1/3
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alone, reportedly carried out more drone strikes than the previous 
eight years combined under President Bush.21  Indeed, drones were 
the poster child of President Obama’s fight against terrorism.22  
Although the U.S.’ drone program is the most expansive, the 
U.S. is not the only country to possess this technology.23  State and 
non-State actors reportedly possess drones, including the United 
Kingdom, France, Russia, Turkey, India, China, Hezbollah, Israel, 
and Iran.24  This continued technological development will make it 
unavoidable and certain that more States and non-State actors will 
also soon possess drone weapon technology.25  With the 
proliferation of technological developments in the military context, 
States will certainly shift to acquiring and developing FAWs and 
ultimately, deploying these weapons in the battlefield.26  
Militaries around the world, including the U.S., have 
devoted many resources and efforts in acquiring FAWs, and are 
currently in the process of producing such weapons.27  Peter Singer, 
a known expert on the proliferation of robotic weapons, indicates 
that “besides the U.S., there are 43 other nations that are also 
building, buying and using military robotics today.”28  In fact, to 
date, several military robotic-automation systems are capable of 
                                                            
21 Ryan J. Vogel, Drone Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict, 39 
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 101, 105 (2010); see also David W. Opderbeck, Drone 
Courts, 44 RUTGERS L.J. 413, 421 (2014) (discussing President Obama’s criteria 
for drone strikes).  
22 Oren Gross, The New Way of War: Is There a Duty to Use Drones?, 
67 FLA. L. REV. 1, 1 (2015).  
23 See Mary Ellen O’Connell, Remarks: The Resort to Drones Under 
International Law, 39 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 585, 586 (2011).  
24 Id. (noting a United Press International report that indicated Israel has 
sold drones to over 42 States).  
25 See Westbrook Mack, supra note 16, at 460 (reporting the number of 
countries that have obtained unmanned aerial vehicle technology is approximately 
seventy-six). 
26 SINGER, supra note 6, at 128 (“[A]utonomous robots on the battlefield 
will be the norm within twenty years.”). 
27 Rogers, supra note 13, at 1258. 
28 Steve Kanigher, Author talks about military robotics and the changing 
face of war, LAS VEGAS SUN (Mar. 17, 2011, 2:01 AM) 
https://lasvegassun.com/news/2011/mar/17/military-robotics-and-changing-face-
war/ (question and answer interview format with Peter Singer). 
7
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sensing their environment and actuating; however, human 
involvement is still present as humans are the last line of decision 
making and ultimately responsible for deploying lethal force.29  
Based on these trends, many experts believe that FAWs are 
inevitable and imminent as the future weapons of war.30  
The U.S. Department of Defense defines an autonomous 
weapon system as a “system that, once activated, can select and 
engage targets without further intervention by a human operator.”31  
The key difference between an autonomous weapon system and a 
remotely-controlled drone is that human input activation is required 
in the latter.32  A hypothetical example of a FAW is a drone that can 
identify and carry out a strike without human intervention (i.e., 
without a remote pilot or crew), but based on cues from the 
surroundings, quantitative algorithms, and threat level 
determinations.33  Indeed, these weapon systems, once activated, 
would be capable of making their own decisions without human 
intervention.34  The core of full autonomy is “the capability to 
identify, target, and attack a person or object without human 
interface.”35  
B. Policy 
From a policy perspective, FAWs are extremely appealable 
to the State attempting to engage and target enemies.36  Specifically, 
armed drones permit targeted killings with little to no risk to a 
State’s military personnel, they limit military personnel’s exposure 
                                                            
29 See Marchant et al., supra note 5, at 276. 
30 Id. 
31 Daniel N. Hammond, Autonomous Weapons and the Problem of State 
Accountability, 15 CHI. J. INT’L L. 652, 658–59 (2015) (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF 
DEF., DIRECTIVE 3000.09: AUTONOMY IN WEAPON SYSTEMS 13 (Nov. 21, 2012)). 
32 Id. at 659. 
33 Id.  
34 See id.  
35 Michael N. Schmitt & Jeffrey S. Thurnher, “Out of the Loop”: 
Autonomous Weapon Systems and the Law of Armed Conflict, 4 HARV. NAT’L 
SEC. J. 231, 235 (2013).  
36 Philip Alston (Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, 
summary or arbitrary executions), Study on targeted killings, ¶ 27, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010). 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss1/3
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to hostile terrain, and can be remotely operated in the home State—
granted that this perk will be eliminated with FAWs.37  In addition, 
the use of FAWs allows a home-State to focus its operations by 
targeting and engaging specified targets, with the intention of 
forcing the enemy to abandon key access points and preventing 
future terrorist attacks, as opposed to amassing ground forces for a 
physical invasion.38  The ways of war are evolving, with the strategy 
turning to engaging in military power quickly, decisively, and with 
minimal casualties.39  Additional policy benefits include “flexibility 
for expanded missions, complete safety for human operators, fewer 
manning and training costs, and vast new attack capabilities.”40  
C. Challenges Posed by the Issue 
Many of the dangers and challenges associated with FAWs 
currently exist in today’s deployed weapon systems.41  Although a 
State can exercise force whenever it chooses, and by whatever 
means, there still remains questions of whether its actions are legal 
and justifiable.  Additional challenges arise when the level of human 
intervention becomes more diminished and uncertain, which in 
effect, increases the role of computers and machines.42  The debate 
then shifts from the question of whether it is lawful to use drones in 
targeted killings, to whether it is lawful to use FAWs to select and 
target enemies without human intervention.43  There are two ends of 
the spectrum when analyzing the legality of FAWs: the advocates of 
their use and the critics, each side raising strong arguments.44  
However, in the middle of all this debate there is one absolute—the 
                                                            
37 Id.  
38 See Gross, supra note 22, at 24–25.   
39 See id. at 24 (comparing United States’ old strategy of war to its new 
strategy).  
40 Jack M. Beard, Autonomous Weapons and Human Responsibilities, 45 
GEO. J. INT’L L. 617, 624 (2014). 
41 Id. at 620. 
42 See id.  
43 See Tetyana Krupiy, Of Souls, Spirits and Ghosts: Transposing the 
Application of the Rules of Targeting to Lethal Autonomous Robots, 16 MELB. J. 
INT’L L. 145, 146 (2015). 
44 See Rogers, supra note 13, at 1259. 
9
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law of conflict has lagged far behind the current, and future, methods 
of warfare.45  Indeed, the main challenge is the certainty that the 
advancement of technology will outpace international legal 
developments.46  
In today’s international realm, no laws or treaties exist that 
specifically pertain to the prohibition or governance of FAWs,47 
which undoubtedly is the biggest challenge posed by the 
technological development of FAWs.48  Specifically, “[t]his new 
technology creates new pressure points for international law . . . 
[States] will be trying to apply international law written for the 
Second War to Star Trek technology.”49  A 2013 U.N. Report 
concluded that autonomous weapons should be approached with 
“great caution,”50 and recommended establishing an international 
body to “monitor the situation and articulate the options for the 
longer term.”51  There still remains conflict in different jurisdictions 
in determining whether these weapons should be developed, 
regulated, or completely prohibited.52  For example, States such as 
Costa Rica and Pakistan have decided to completely prohibit the 
development of FAWs;53 South Korea, Israel, and Russia reportedly 
deploy FAWs to assist in border and military base patrol;54 while 
the U.S. persists in further development of these weapons and will 
inevitably employ this technology in the battlefield.55  
                                                            
45 Eric Talbot Jensen, The Future of the Law of Armed Conflict: 
Ostriches, Butterflies, and Nanobots, 35 MICH. J. INT’L L. 253, 254–57 (2014) 
(discussing the difficulty analyzing the law of armed conflict and the future 
development of methods of warfare). 
46 See Bradan T. Thomas, Autonomous Weapons Systems: The Anatomy 
of Autonomy and the Legality of Lethality, 37 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 235, 246 (2015). 
47 Marchant et al., supra note 5, at 289. 
48 SINGER, supra note 6, at 387. 
49 Id. (emphasis in original). 
50 Christof Heyns (Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or 
arbitrary executions, Lethal autonomous robotics (LARs), ¶ 109, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/23/47 (Apr. 9, 2013). 
51 Id. ¶ 112. 
52 See Rebecca Crootof, The Killer Robots Are Here: Legal and Policy 
Implications, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1837, 1839–40 (2015). 
53 Krupiy, supra note 43, at 146. 
54 See Crootof, supra note 52, at 1839–40. 
55 Krupiy, supra note 43, at 146. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss1/3
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To address these challenges, international law must develop 
an effective legal doctrine concerning the future use of this force.56  
Indeed, there are minimal doctrines concerning FAWs today; 
instead, aspects of FAWs are covered only by piecemeal legislation 
pertaining to the projection and prospects of future use of this force 
under international law.57  There must be a guiding principle or 
vision.58  As military technology develops, there have been multiple 
conventions in international law purporting to address new weapons 
and practices.  These include agreements about “biological 
weapons, chemical weapons, certain types of ammunition, the 
hostile use of environmental modification, land mines, incendiary 
weapons, blinding laser weapons and numerous others.”59  Now, is 
the time to fully to address the best practices to govern FAWs, and 
to determine whether this type of force will “maintain international 
peace and security” among nations or whether it will contradict the 
underlying principles of the U.N. Charter.60 
III. CONTEMPORARY VIEWS ON THE ISSUE 
A. Advocates of Fully Autonomous Weapons 
Advocates of FAWs assert that there is one clear trend in 
international affairs: “warfare will continue and autonomous 
weapons will ultimately be deployed in its conduct.”61  The reality 
that war is unavoidable fuels a desire to make warfare less horrific, 
minimize civilian casualties, and allow for better enforcement of 
international law principles.62  Advocates do not focus on the 
                                                            
56 SINGER, supra note 6, at 210. 
57 See Marchant et al., supra note 5, at 289. 
58 SINGER, supra note 6, at 210. 
59 Marchant et al., supra note 5, at 289–90; see also id. (noting the United 
States is not a party to any of these conventions).  
60 U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 1. 
61 RONALD C. ARKIN, GEOR. INST. OF TECH., GOVERNING LETHAL 
BEHAVIOR: EMBEDDING ETHICS IN A HYBRID DELIBERATIVE/REACTIVE ROBOT 
ARCHITECTURE 6, https://www.cc.gatech.edu/ai/robot-lab/online-
publications/formalizationv35.pdf. 
62 Christopher P. Toscano, “Friend of Humans”: An Argument for 
Developing Autonomous Weapons Systems, 8 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 189, 244–
45 (2015). 
11
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“science fiction” characterization that these weapons will create an 
environment of all out robotic warfare.63  Instead, advocates focus 
on the benefits of human soldiers coexisting with autonomous 
weapons64—a team, with autonomous robots having the “potential 
capability of independently and objectively monitoring ethical 
behavior.”65 
The crux of the advocates’ claims is this notion of “riskless 
war” and “wars without casualties.”66  By deploying FAWs, humans 
will no longer be at the forefront of the battlefield; therefore, there 
will be a significant reduction in the number of military personnel 
killed or wounded when engaging identified targets.67  In addition, 
these weapons will be better equipped to comply with international 
laws because FAWs’ sensors will be able to identify enemies with 
more precision.68  By engaging targets with higher accuracy, it is 
more likely that innocent civilians will be safe from an authorized 
attack.69  Marc Garlasco, a senior military analyst at Human Rights 
Watch, pointed out that precision guided technologies can help save 
lives because these “[weapons] allow far greater discrimination in 
targeting and save civilian lives as a result.”70 
B. Critics of Fully Autonomous Weapons 
Critics of FAWs focus on the uncertainty and 
unpredictability of these weapons, and their prospective uses in the 
battlefield. It is well-established that “[c]omplex systems are prone 
to component failures and malfunctions, and to intermodule 
inconsistencies and misunderstandings.”71  Critics of FAWs 
emphasize the unpredictability of the software and the lack of 
                                                            
63 ARKIN, supra note 61, at 5. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 6–7. 
66 Heyns, supra note 50, ¶ 86. 
67 Rogers, supra note 13, at 1259. 
68 Id. at 1259–60. 
69 Id.  
70 SINGER, supra note 6, at 388. 
71 Marchant et al., supra note 5, at 283–84 (quoting Roger Clarke, 
Asimov's Laws of Robotics Implications for Information Technology-Part II, 27 
COMPUTER 57, 65 (1994)). 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss1/3
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awareness of the risks associated with employing FAWs.72  Some 
critics argue that FAWs will never comply with the lawful use of 
force and, therefore, are inherently unlawful.73  Other critics raise 
hypothetical concerns like: (1) FAWs being vulnerable to hacking, 
which may lead to non-State actors intercepting FAWs; (2) FAWs’ 
possible inability to select and engage targets, which may result in 
catastrophic errors; (3) the continued technological developments 
may increase the military utility of a weapon; and (4) the prospect 
of targeted killings by FAWs may lead to animosity and future 
terrorist attacks.74 
Additionally, critics also warn that the full-scale 
development of FAWs “risk[s] setting off a global arms race.”75  
This arms race would lead to FAWs being available at a cheap price, 
which would allow FAWs to be readily available to rogue States and 
violent extremists.76  In fact, “this reduced cost may, in turn, reduce 
the rigor with which non-violent alternatives are pursued and thus 
encourage unnecessary—and therefore unjust—wars.”77  
Ultimately, the critics either call for a complete prohibition or, in the 
alternative, impose stringent regulations on FAWs. 
IV. THE LAWS OF WAR: USING FAWS IN THE CONTEXT OF USE OF 
FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The laws of war establish principles and parameters that 
allow a State to legally and justifiably employ use of force.78  
Although the laws of war are separated into two distinct categories, 
“Jus ad Bellum,” Latin for the “right to wage war,” is only discussed 
herein.79 Jus ad Bellum is characterized as the set of rules that 
                                                            
72 Id. at 284. 
73 See Crootof, supra note 52, at 1872–73. 
74 Heyns, supra note 50, ¶ 98. 
75 Matthew Rosenberg & John Markoff, The Pentagon’s ‘Terminator 
Conundrum’: Robots That Could Kill on Their Own, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/26/us/pentagon-artificial-intelligence-
terminator.html. 
76 Id. 
77 Marchant et al., supra note 5, at 285. 
78 Larson & Malamud, supra note 3, at 2–3. 
79 Id. 
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govern a State’s legal right to use military force and engage in 
warfare.80  Today, the U.N. Charter, which prescribes the governing 
laws of the initiation of war,81 is the modern codification of the 
principles of Jus ad Bellum.82  
The U.N. Charter emphatically begins with its principle 
purposes: “To maintain international peace and security” 83 and “[t]o 
develop friendly relations among nations.”84  In order to maintain 
peace and security, the U.N. Charter prescribes general principles 
and a structured framework for governing the laws of war. 
Specifically, the U.N. Charter codifies a general prohibition on the 
use of force and declares that “[a]ll Members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations.”85  However, this is not an absolute prohibition. There are 
narrow exceptions that do not constitute a breach of a State’s 
sovereignty or an unjustified use of force.86  First, a State is 
authorized to use force upon the Security Council’s authorization to 
maintain security and peace.87  Second, a State has an inherent right 
of self-defense to respond to an “armed attack,” which raises the 
question of expanding this right to preemptive or anticipatory self-
defense.88  There remains other possible legally, cognizable 
                                                            
80 Justin Desautels-Stein, The Judge and the Drone, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 
117, 167 (2014). 
81 See James A.R. Nafziger, Going to War and Going Ahead with the 
Law, 50 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 321, 346 (2014). 
82 Larson & Malamud, supra note 3, at 4.  
83 U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 1. 
84 Id. ¶ 2. 
85 Id. art. 2, ¶ 4. 
86 Michael N. Schmitt, Narrowing the International Law Divide: The 
Drone Debate Matures, 39 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 1, 3 (2014); see also Larson 
& Malamud, supra note 3, at 16–19 (discussing the United States’ anticipatory 
self-defense justification for drone strikes in Pakistan following the U.S. invasion 
of Afghanistan). 
87 Schmitt, supra note 86, at 3. 
88 Molly McNab & Megan Matthews, Clarifying the Law Relating to 
Unmanned Drones and the Use of Force: The Relationships Between Human 
Rights, Self-Defense, Armed Conflict, and International Humanitarian Law, 39 
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 661, 664 (2011).  
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arguments for when a State may justifiably use force, including 
consent of territorially invaded States, ungoverned territory, and hot 
pursuit.89  
The non-existent legal framework surrounding FAWs is a 
prime example of technology outpacing the laws of war.  In the 
absence of any treaty or the United Nation’s prohibitions on FAWs, 
this Article shifts focus to current justifications for using 
international force to evaluate the lawfulness of the future use of 
these weapons, including: U.N. Security Council resolutions; self-
defense—including preemptive or anticipatory self-defense; 
consent of territorially invaded States; ungoverned territory; and hot 
pursuit.  Specifically, focusing on the application of these legal 
justifications to FAWs and, ultimately, proposing a legal and policy 
approach to regulate and govern this fast-paced development of 
technology, which will impact international use of force laws.  
A. U.N. Security Council Resolutions 
A State is authorized to use force when the U.N. Security 
Council invokes its authority under the U.N. Charter.90  Specifically, 
the Security Council is authorized to take “such action as it deems 
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.”91  With respect to its permitted authority, the Security 
Council has authorized the deployment of military personnel to 
resist acts of aggression and restore peace.92  Additionally, a U.N. 
Security Council’s resolution increases transparency and legitimacy 
of the right of a State to use force.93  
The U.N. Security Council has authorized a State’s use of 
force in different circumstances, depending on the existing threat or 
breach of peace.94  This can drastically increase, however, with 
States deploying FAWs.  Specifically, under what circumstances 
                                                            
89 See generally Larson & Malamud, supra note 3, at 11–21. 
90 William H. Taft, IV, International Law and the Use of Force, 36 GEO. 
J. INT’L L. 659, 661 (2005). 	
91 U.N. Charter art. 51. 
92 Taft, IV, supra note 90, at 661. 
93 Hitomi Takemura, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Humanization from 
International Humanitarian Law, 32 WIS. INT’L L.J. 521, 530 (2014). 
94 U.N. Charter arts. 39, 41. 
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would another States’ deployment of FAWs into another States’ 
territory constitute a threat or breach of peace.  This is what 
transpires when we are the target.  Instead of opening the floodgates 
of States seeking authorization for attacking or deploying FAWs, 
the U.N. Security Council must pass resolutions setting forth 
guidelines that specifically address the use of FAWs.95  These 
resolutions must reaffirm the principles of the laws of war in the 
international arena.  With the potential of the current legal 
framework lagging behind the use of FAWs, there is a quandary 
when States deploy FAWs with no intention of using force or 
breaching the peace, which then leads a host State, reluctant to 
extend the invitation, portraying this invasion of territory as an act 
of aggression.  Ultimately, FAWs will inevitably pose a threat to a 
host State, which may lead to States constantly seeking an 
authorization to use force against the FAWs because of the non-
existent guidelines or principles.  
B. Self-Defense—Including Preemptive or Anticipatory Self-
Defense 
Although the U.N. Charter codifies a general prohibition on 
the use of force, it also recognizes that a State has an inherent and 
collective right to self-defense in response to an armed attack.96  
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter stipulates, “[n]othing in the present 
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the U.N., 
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security.”97 There is much leeway granted 
to a State to defend themselves preemptively and without having 
suffered the first blow.98 The deployment of FAWs would make the 
“armed attack” requirement of Article 51 obsolete because these 
weapons will be capable of identifying an attack before it happens—
                                                            
95 See Edieth Y. Wu, Drones in the Fight Against Terrorism—Should the 
Global Community Stringently Regulate Their Use?, 65 SYRACUSE L. REV. 273, 
295 (2015). 
96 Larson & Malamud, supra note 3, at 4. 
97 U.N. Charter art. 51. 
98 Matthew C. Waxman, The Use of Force Against States That Might 
Have Weapons of Mass Destruction, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 5–6 (2009). 
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i.e., a preemptive or an anticipatory measure to safeguard a State 
from an “imminent attack.”99  
Although FAWs may be capable of preventing an imminent 
attack, States must not expand the self-defense doctrine to allow for 
unauthorized cross-border incursions or unauthorized killings.100  
Instead, the focus should be on the FAWs ability to prevent 
catastrophic destruction and the loss of life.  For example, FAWs 
will be capable of identifying explosive devices in the battlefield or 
in terrorist prone areas and, therefore, will be able to eliminate these 
devices and threats without the killing or maiming of civilians.101  
The problem with a preemptive or an anticipatory attack is the 
notion that States will unjustifiably attack targets without there 
being an actual, imminent threat. FAWs will allow for a different 
application of this doctrine because FAWs will focus on the means 
and methods that kill, instead of the targeting of an alleged terrorist.  
Ultimately, justifying force on the basis of preemptive or 
anticipatory self-defense must be limited in all circumstances; 
however, FAWs will change the application of this doctrine because 
FAWs will be capable of intercepting an attack, as opposed to 
anticipating an armed attack.102  
C. Consent of the Territorially Invaded State 
Another viable use of force justification for using FAWs in 
another State’s territory is to obtain consent from the host State.103  
Once a State obtains consent, its conduct becomes lawful, even 
though its conduct would be unlawful if conducted without 
permission.104  “[I]nternational law today does not clearly prohibit 
states from using consent as a partial or complete rationale for their 
forcible actions in another state’s territory, even where that consent 
purports to authorize an activity that the host state legally could not 
                                                            
99 Takemura, supra note 93, at 528–29.  
100 Larson & Malamud, supra note 3, at 4. 
101 Marchant et al., supra note 5, at 289. 
102 McNab & Matthews, supra note 88, at 682–83.  
103 Zora Ahmed, Strengthening Standards for Consent: The Case of U.S. 
Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 23 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 459, 482 (2015). 
104 Id. 
17
FIGUEROA ARTICLE FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/26/19  10:34 PM 
162 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. 31:1 
undertake.”105 Consent, however, raises difficult questions 
concerning the nuances of an agreement and what exactly was 
consented to—i.e., the terms of the contract.106  Specifically, consent 
to use force in a host State operates as an agreement where parties 
intend to be legally bound and governed by international law.107 
 With respect to FAWs and consent, States who do not 
possess the technological capabilities to develop these weapons are 
provided with an extra sense of security by consenting to another 
State’s use of these weapons in their territory.  States can now agree 
to the specific computer algorithms for deploying these weapons.  
They can have a direct input on the territory for which these 
weapons will monitor, and can agree to a threat level determination 
that deploys force. In fact, FAWs will eliminate the human 
determination that is a cause of conflict between the States using 
force and the host State.  Instead, both parties will have a direct 
involvement and can be held accountable if FAWs result in 
unjustified killings—since both were at the drawing board and 
together made the determination on when and how to target 
enemies.  In contrast, one of the concerns with invoking consent as 
a means to use force, is that it expands the U.N. Charter’s justified 
uses of force because these provisions, as drafted, are quite limited 
in scope.108  But this concern focuses on the general prohibition on 
the use of force and self-defense, rather than focusing on the U.N. 
Charter’s principal purposes of “maintain[ing] international peace 
and security”109 and “develop[ing] friendly relations among 
nations.”110  Ultimately, by allowing parties to agree to FAWs, with 
the elimination of the human aspect from either State, States may be 
capable of developing better relations and security within the host 
State.   
                                                            
105 Ashley S. Deeks, Consent to the Use of Force and International Law 
Supremacy, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 26–27 (2013). 
106 Larson & Malamud, supra note 3, at 20. 
107 Deeks, supra note 105, at 18. 
108 Justin M. Ndichu, “Plugging a Leak”: A Preliminary Step in 
Establishing a Nuanced Approach to Govern Intervention in the New Age, 49 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 201, 222 (2016). 
109 U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 1. 
110 Id. ¶ 2. 
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D. Hot Pursuit 
Hot pursuit, evolving from customary international law and 
later codified,111 is a doctrine that grants the “constructive extension 
of jurisdiction against suspect foreign vessels that flee from law 
enforcement action within a jurisdictional zone.”112  The application 
of this doctrine primarily focuses on allowing governmental law 
enforcement assets to pursue vessels that have violated maritime law 
within the jurisdictional waters of a coastal State.113  The crux of this 
doctrine is that the pursuit “must be hot and continuous.”114  The 
term “hot” provides for an immediacy requirement regarding the 
commencement of pursuit and requires that the pursuit must quickly 
follow the committed infringement.115  Although more 
idiosyncrasies exists, a brief definition is necessary to allow for a 
discussion on the application of hot pursuit to FAWs.  
 States can justify using FAWs to pursue terrorists that cross-
borders into other States by applying the doctrine of hot pursuit (if 
the doctrine is expanded and adapted to sovereign land).116  
Specifically, to employ FAWs under the justification of hot pursuit, 
a target must have been physically present in a State, committed an 
act that violated the laws or regulations of that State, and the FAW 
adapted to the situation based on its own intelligence, without 
human intervention, and targeted or pursued the perpetrators into 
another State.117  The question remains: will FAWs be capable of 
identifying this scenario and then thereafter, targeting and chasing 
the correct perpetrator?  Although concerns remain for invading 
                                                            
111 Vasilios Tasikas, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and the Doctrine of Hot 
Pursuit: A New Era of Coast Guard Maritime Law Enforcement Operations, 29 
TUL. MAR. L.J. 59, 68–69 (2004) (noting that the customary international law 
doctrine of “hot pursuit” was codified in Article 111 of the 1982 U.N. Convention 
on the Law of the Sea). 
112 Id. at 68 (emphasis added).  
113Id. at 71. 
114 Id. at 78 (quoting R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE 
SEA 151 (1983)). 
115 Id.  
116 Larson & Malamud, supra note 3, at 18–19. 
117 See id. (discussing this application of hot pursuit to the facts of the 
United States pursuit of terrorists crossing the border of Afghanistan into 
Pakistan).  
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sovereign land based on this doctrine, FAWs will be capable of swift 
action, satisfying the “immediacy requirement,” and, therefore, 
limiting the threat to sovereignty of the invaded State. Indeed, 
FAWs may be capable of eliminating the chain of command, human 
delay, and other limitations, that will allow for quick and decisive 
action to eliminate the pursued threats. 
 In contrast, there are two constraints that limit FAWs as a 
viable justification for international use of force when applying the 
hot pursuit doctrine.118  These include: (1) static targets, such as 
camps and operation centers; and (2) expanding the hot pursuit 
doctrine to sovereign land.119  These two constraints, however, do 
not outweigh the benefits of employing FAWs under the narrow 
legal justification of hot pursuit.  First, to counter the static target 
argument, FAWs will not have a legal basis for solely invading a 
sovereign to attack enemies where no unlawful act occurred. In fact, 
the immediate pursuit requirement will always be an element under 
this doctrine.  Second, applying this doctrine to sovereign land raises 
the concerns of threatening a State’s sovereignty by invading its 
territory; however, FAWs will be capable of swift and decisive 
actions and, therefore, can be justifiable because there would be no 
threat to “the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state.”120 
 
E. Ungoverned Territory 
The use of FAWs in ungoverned territory is problematic and 
complicated because of the difficulty in classifying an area as 
“ungoverned territory.”121  Although numerous interpretations exist 
for ungoverned territory, one interpretation concludes that a territory 
is ungoverned where “[a] State is absent, unable, or unwilling to 
perform its functions.”122 States, other than the actual host State for 
                                                            
118 Id. at 19. 
119 Id. 
120 See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. 
121 Larson & Malamud, supra note 3, at 20. 
122 Id. (quoting Angel Rabasa, et al., Summary, in Ungoverned 
Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks (2007)).  
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which the territory exists, seek to deploy force and control over 
ungoverned territory.123  This is because these areas provide a 
recruiting ground and base of operations for terrorists, and 
additionally, allow criminal organizations to flourish—which 
possibly lead to arms trades and human trafficking.124  Ultimately, 
defining an area as ungoverned, especially in territories with 
established tribal traditions, poses serious challenges to a State’s 
sovereignty and, therefore, State’s must be mindful of the 
repercussions within the international community.125 
 Although the use of force is not prohibited if a territory is 
truly “ungoverned,” this legal justification should be used as a last 
resort for employing FAWs to target and engage enemies.126  
Indeed, the question of whether a territory is ungoverned can 
increase the potential of conflict and deviate from the U.N. Charter’s 
principle purposes.  FAWs may have a viable legal basis in the 
previously mentioned doctrines, but to employ FAWs on this notion 
that a territory is ungoverned raises serious international political 
concerns.  For example, some of the international community 
question the U.S.’ determination of the Federally Administered 
Tribal Region (FATA) region as ungoverned territory and attribute 
its determination as “western arrogance.”127  Ultimately, a State 
must not base the legality of using force on the justification that a 
territory is ungoverned because of the potential of infringing on a 
State’s sovereignty and the concerns of re-characterizing territories 
for the sole purpose of justifying the use of force in another State.128 
V. PROPOSAL FOR FULLY AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS 
“Any law’s strength depends on its relevance . . . if the new 
technologies are creating a ‘revolution in military affairs,’ we may 
well need a ‘revolution in military legal affairs.’”129  Although much 
remains unknown about the full-scale deployment of FAWs, the 
                                                            
123 Id. at 20. 
124 Id. at 20–21. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 21.  
128 Id. at 21–22.  
129 SINGER, supra note 6, at 407. 
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possibility that FAWs may improve the U.N. Charter’s goal of 
maintaining peace and security should be carefully analyzed before 
a blanket prohibition is imposed on the entire class of weapons.130  
This does not mean that the twentieth-century laws have to be 
jettisoned completely to adapt to today’s conflicts and means of 
war.131  Simply because the laws of war have been outdated, does 
not mean they should be abolished, as these “old laws” codified 
some of the most important international law principles.132  Instead, 
this Article proposes for an open discussion within the U.N. to 
address the benefits and concerns, prior to the full-scale use or 
prohibition of this technology.  As referenced earlier, the laws of 
war lag behind the means of war.  FAWs are different because 
enough information currently exists to develop the appropriate 
governance modules in a timely and proactive manner.133  
An initial policy proposal is to realize the inevitability of the 
proliferation of FAWs, address the benefits, and then establish a 
formal international binding agreement to regulate the uses of these 
weapons.  A State using force against another State or non-State 
actors will always be present because conflict is certainly 
unavoidable.  Thus, States must recognize that FAWs will minimize 
civilian casualties; FAWs will also be more accurate and precise, 
and will save military personnel. 134  These benefits must be part of 
the discussion as opposed to focusing on the lack of human 
intervention.  In contrast, in all out deployment is not the solution 
because fears exist regarding the hacking of FAWs when deployed, 
                                                            
130 See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 3. 
131 SINGER, supra note 6, at 407. 
132 Id.  
133 Marchant et al., supra note 5, at 314.  
134 See Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 35, at 281 (concluding it would 
be irresponsible to prohibit autonomous weapons because “such weapons may 
offer the possibility of attacking the enemy with little risk to the attacker” and 
noting an outright ban would “have the effect of denying commanders a valuable 
tool for minimizing the risk to civilians and civilian objects in certain attack 
scenarios”); see also William C. Marra & Sonia K. McNeil, Understanding “The 
Loop”: Regulating the Next Generation of War Machines, 36 HARV. J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 1139, 1166 (2013) (noting that “[d]iminished political tolerance for 
military casualties has . . . made [today’s] drones more politically palatable, 
because they keep soldiers farther from the battlefield and preserve the lives of 
American servicemen”). 
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the lack of State accountability, and the unpredictability of the wide 
scale use of these weapons.  With these benefits and fears, this 
Article recognizes that there is always an obligation for States to 
develop technologies in fear that another State will be ahead. But 
that obligation must be countered by a successful system of good 
governance.135 
A system of good governance involves “clearly defined and 
articulated expectations.”136  The first proposed regulation focuses 
on a limitation of FAWs by establishing clearly defined rules on 
what activities FAWs can observe, what locations they can observe, 
and the duration of such observation.137  Specifically, these 
regulations would create an “observational stage” where FAWs 
would be restricted to certain hotspot locations and be required to 
comply with a defined observational period before carrying out a 
“kill mission.”138  By defining the location and requiring an 
observational period, these regulations would directly affect how 
“the machine’s capacity [] orient[s] itself, the number and type of 
actions weighed when the machine decides, and the eventual act 
carried out.”139  For example, a State could be authorized, either by 
a U.N. resolution or any applicable justification, to deploy FAWs in 
certain locations to observe terrorist activities for a permitted time 
frame, which would allow FAWs to collect a large amount of data 
and detail, and then based on the data collected, decide to carry out 
the targeted killing.  This process of a lengthier and detailed 
observation would allow the FAWs’ final decision to be more 
discriminating and accurate.140 
The next proposed regulation focuses on the FAWs’ “kill” 
determination.141  Regulations are necessary to establish program 
                                                            
135 Marchant et al., supra note 5, at 314. 
136 Id. (emphasis in original). 
137 Marra & McNeil, supra note 134, at 1180–81. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
140 Id. 
141 See Hammond, supra note 31, at 662 (noting that “[t]he ability of 
[autonomous weapon systems] to operate without human oversight gives rise to 
[an] accountability problem” in international law); Thompson Chengeta, 
Accountability Gap: Autonomous Weapon Systems and Modes of Responsibility 
in International Law, 45 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 49 (2016) (recognizing that 
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constraints for FAWs that will restrict the weapon from deploying 
unauthorized and illegal lethal force.142  Specifically, States must 
agree on detailed threshold determinations (e.g., proportionality and 
distinction thresholds), which are programed into FAWs, requiring 
the weapon to process and evaluate the information assuring that the 
attack is proper under the programmed operational orders.143  This 
means that FAWs, prior to being fully employed in the battlefield, 
must have programmed algorithms with agreed upon thresholds, and 
then determine if their use of force actions are lawful under the 
preprogrammed constraints.144  By allowing threshold 
determinations, the FAWs become more restrictive and accountable 
when deploying lethal force.145  
The two proposed regulations are merely a starting point for 
regulating these new technologies.  There must be a binding 
agreement between States and the U.N.’s involvement. Specifically, 
domestic checklists and balances are not enough to combat the 
proliferation of FAWs.  Indeed, global collaboration is a necessity.  
When States have open discussions, however, it is unrealistic to 
expect major world contributors to sign off on a complete weapon 
prohibition.146 
In fact, the superior approach to proliferation of FAWs is 
establishing limitations on technological development and agreeing 
to specific rules governing their use, rather than attempting a 
complete prohibition.147  For example, the Oslo Convention of 2008, 
                                                            
“[t]he challenges that are posed by [autonomous weapon systems] as far as 
accountability of violations [of International Law] is concerned must be taken 
seriously”). 
142 Christopher P. Toscano, supra note 62, at 218.  
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 See John Lewis, The Case for Regulating Fully Autonomous 
Weapons, 124 YALE L.J. 1309, 1317–18 (2015); see also UN meeting targets 
‘killer roots’, UN NEWS (May 14, 2014), 
https://news.un.org/en/story/2014/05/468302-un-meeting-targets-killer-robots. 
In May of 2014, U.N. officials met to discuss a full prohibition on FAWs, with 
the top U.N. official of the meeting declaring: “You have the opportunity to take 
pre-emptive action and ensure that the ultimate decision to end life remains firmly 
under human control.” Id. 
147 Lewis, supra note 146, at 1317. 
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which sought to ban cluster munitions, illustrates the World’s 
reluctance to sign off on a complete ban of these weapons.148  In this 
convention, several States, including China, Russia, and the U.S., 
failed to sign the agreement;  the reasons for their denial: military 
necessity.149  This example, among other failed weapon ban 
agreements, illustrates that States are unlikely to agree on a 
complete ban on weapons they currently intend to use or develop.150 
The superior approach when recognizing the previous 
failures associated with attempting a complete weapon prohibition, 
is to consider the components and framework of an effective 
regulatory scheme.151  For example, landmines, which are already 
regulated under international law, share important similarities with 
FAWs.152  With respect to the regulation of landmines, the Amended 
Protocol provided the following framework: (1) policies to 
safeguard the proliferation of landmines; (2) a geographical and 
spatial criteria for where these weapons could be deployed; (3) a 
definition of indiscriminate use; (4) specific military objective 
requirements; and (5) additional protections on the governance of 
landmines.153  Landmines are a highly technical weapon system and 
therefore, the Amended Protocol establishes guiding precedent 
regarding the future regulations of FAWs.154  With the guidance of 
the Amended Protocol, an ideal regulatory scheme would build from 
the effectiveness of this regulation, and to the extent ambiguities 
remain, States must encourage open discussion to evolve 
comprehensive ideas directed towards the emergence of new, 
relevant international law for FAWs.155 
                                                            
148 Id. at 1317–18.  
149 Id. at 1318 n.50. 
150 Id. at 1317–18. 
151 Id. at 1318–19. 
152 Id. at 1319. 
153 Id. at 1319–20; see Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the 
Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, May 3, 1996, 2048 U.N.T.S. 93.   
154 Lewis, supra note 146, at 1322. 
155 See Crootof, supra note 52, at 1895 (“In the absence of intentional 
regulation, the unchecked development of autonomous weapon systems may well 
pose a significant threat to fundamental humanitarian principles and protections—
and, by extension, to human lives.”). 
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 In the absence of international regulation, FAWs will remain 
unchecked and raise significant threats to the current international 
use of force legal framework.156  This Article, however, emphasizes 
the importance of opening discussion to legitimize the need for 
international attention and regulation for FAWs.157  Entities—
including States, the U.N., developers, and manufacturers—must 
begin working toward a regulation that focuses on “clearly defined 
and articulated expectations.”158  This can be accomplished by 
considering the proposals of this Article: (1) establish clearly 
defined rules for FAWs’ observation periods and permitted 
locations; (2) establish agreed upon thresholds for FAWs’ 
operational orders; and (3) reframe previously effective regulations 
to create a workable regulation for FAWs.  Ultimately, States and 
the U.N. must not squander this opportunity to finally allow the laws 
of war to dictate new technology in the battlefield instead of new 
technology dictating the laws of war.159 
VI. CONCLUSION 
FAWs will, indeed, revolutionize warfare and the 
application of international use of force laws.  Now, is the time for 
the debate to shift to developing a legal framework to adapt to this 
technology.  As technology continues to advance, political, legal, 
and cultural considerations will act as a safeguard for the full-scale 
deployment of FAWs.160  This, however, must not be the only 
safeguard in our international legal system. This Article proposes 
for a full-fledged discussion within States and the U.N. to finally 
adopt a legal framework that coincides with the advancement of 
technology.  Warfare is part of the human condition, but we, 
together, can pursue better principles to better shape and regulate the 
                                                            
156 See id. at 1896 (“It is still possible to proactively employ legal means 
to channel how this new technology develops and is used, but the window of 
opportunity is closing. The time to act is now.”) 
157 See id. at 1897 (“States and other parties interested in the governance 
of this new weaponry can begin working toward it now.”). 
158 Marchant et al., supra note 5, at 290. 
159 See SINGER, supra note 6, at 387 (“New technology has often moved 
faster than the laws of war.”). 
160 Marra & McNeil, supra note 134, at 1185. 
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practice of war.  Indeed, “[o]ur robotic creations are creating new 
dimensions and dynamics for our human wars and politics that we 
are only now just beginning to fathom.”161  With this insight, we can 
begin to create a legal framework that works to limit the resort to 
using force, or in the alternative, works to improve accountability 
for when there is unlawful use of force.  We as humans, “fear what 
[we] don’t know,” and change is coming in warfare, but it is time to 
take preventive measures and finally allow the laws of war to dictate 
the development and use of FAWs.162 
 
                                                            
161 SINGER, supra note 6, at 431. 
162 Id. at 436. 
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